Abstract-Practical encryption systems with new and more flexible capabilities have been enabled by recent advances in computing hardware performance and Property Preserving Encryption (PPE) schemes. PPE schemes allow limited and preselected operations to be performed on encrypted data allowing system designers to trade-off between performance, security and functionality. This paper uses micro-benchmark to evaluate three interdependent factors of PPE: performance, security and functionality. The findings validate the efficacy of this technique and provide guidance to application designers and technology evaluators seeking to understand these interdependent relationships for PPE database applications. Experiments were performed using the CryptDB research system. Results validate the previous assessments of CryptDB and provide supplemental detail on performance, security and functionality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Systems using Property Preserving Encryption (PPE) [1] schemes can provide broad functionality, with alternative schemes allowing differing subsets of operations to be performed on encrypted data. While these schemes permit a range of operations, they have different performance and security characteristics and cannot be used interchangeably.
Previous evaluations have used blended and full stack macro-benchmarks to provide useful overviews of the aggregate performance and functional characteristics of systems but they do not provide sufficient detail to inform design decisions. End-to-end performance measures can be dominated by factors other than data retrieval; for example, the measured total client-server round-trip time for a typical web application can include: proxy negotiation, DNS lookups, connection establishment, SSL negotiation, request sending, server preprocessing, multiple database calls, server post-processing and content transfer. Conversely caching layers in application software stacks can improve measured performance by reducing database calls. Benchmarks that synthetically represent the intended workload of a system such as the SQL TPC-C [2] or workloads based on execution of specific applications make it difficult to isolate system performance factors, and the distribution of sample query types may not be representative for the target application.
In contrast, in this paper we use a Micro-Benchmarking evaluation approach. Micro-benchmarks provide a mechanism for specific feature evaluations in isolation; as well as full system characterisation. They are also useful for application and system designers as a regression tool to evaluate the performance of system updates. In this study, a micro-benchmark will refer to the minimal viable test of a combination of a specific data-type, payload and SQL operation across the various encryption schemes. A viable test exercises the system as a user would and must not cause unexpected side effects. Unlike aggregated benchmarking, this approach restricts evaluation to the system under test and allows the performance of each operation mode to be explored in isolation. The study presents an micro-benchmarking approach to PPE system evaluation where each unique viable combination of datatype, operation and encryption mode are exercised. Micro-Benchmarking is a mature technique that has been applied in other performance evaluations, e.g. [3] , [4] , [5] .
Section II of this paper gives an introduction to the system under test (CryptDB) and Section II-A reviews the existing evaluations in the literature. Section III presents the technique used with the results in Section IV. Sections V and VI present our conclusions and future research opportunities. From a terminology perspective, it should be noted that the phrase "Primary Key" is used in this paper to refer to the database column that uniquely identifies a row in a table; it should not be confused with a cryptographic key.
II. CryptDB CryptDB [6] is a research database proxy that encrypts data before it is stored in an unmodified MySQL or PostGres database. The threat model for CryptDB is the Honest-butCurious [7] database administrator. In this threat model the database administrator can view the data in the database but not interfere with the data contents or structures. Figure 1 978-1-5386-6046-1/18/$31.00 c 2018 IEEE shows a typical usage and the experimental setup for this paper. CryptDB can use multiple/different encryption schemes for each database column to allow a range of SQL operations on encrypted data. Application designers can specify the scheme(s) or allow CryptDB to determine the appropriate scheme via a training mode. If multiple schemes are used for a single column the number of encrypted columns is increased. Fig. 1 . CryptDB usage. CryptDB is implemented as a SQL proxy for a unmodified SQL database. CryptDB addresses the threat of an adversary with access to the SQL server. In this paper micro-benchmarks are executed with and without the CryptDB proxy. Timings were measured for ∆t1 and ∆t2.
The encryption schemes used by CryptDB are: Encryption that supports addition after [10] . Additional schemes for joins JOIN, OPE-JOIN and a SEARCH scheme (after [11] ) were not evaluated as the optimised version of CryptDB used in [6] is unavailable and the published version does not support these schemes.
These schemes can be added, changed and re-encrypted automatically so that additional SQL functions can be performed; although this mode of operation is not desirable for production scenarios as it reduces security while incurring an additional-overhead. An example of a steady-state (posttraining) configuration is illustrated in Table I , the encrypted data is stored in the table structure shown in the right column. From inspection of this example it is apparent that a single plaintext (unencrypted) 4 byte integer may consume up to 270 bytes of storage when encrypted with three encryption schemes. When the application inserts or updates a value in the encrypted column the three encrypted values must be recalculated.
A. Prior CryptDB Evaluations
The developers of CryptDB presented an evaluation of the system in their paper outlining the system [6] . Results for the standardised TPC-C benchmark query mix indicating an overall throughput reduction with CryptDB of 21-26% and a latency increase of up to 11 ms depending on configuration. This measured the throughput for the underlying MySQL database with a MySQL Proxy deployed, compared to a CryptDB proxy and MySQL. The use of MySQL Proxy is not a generally required component for MySQL and an increase in latency of 600% is seen when a CryptDB proxy system is compared with a MySQL system without such a proxy. (This configuration is used in this paper, Section IV-A explores the overhead of this architecture). With the TPC-C benchmark there was a storage factor penalty of 3.76 i.e. the encrypted database consumes 3.76 times the storage space compared to a standard plaintext MySQL database.
Benchmarks [6] of multi-user web applications showed an addition of 7-18 ms (6-20%) per HTTP request and throughput reduction of 14.5%. with a storage factor penalty of 1.2. In this test less than 5% of the total columns in the applications tested were encrypted; while the performance workload includes queries that do not require the encryption/decryption of data.
A separate study [12] presents storage factors of 2 and 2.85 in two differing scenarios. The variance in reported storage factors in the above research is due to the different number of encrypted columns and encryption schemes in effect during the benchmarks; HOM encrypted columns in particular consumes 64 times the storage of the plaintext.
III. MICRO-BENCHMARKING APPROACH
Following the minimal viable test criteria a series of tests were developed and executed against an encrypted database and a plaintext control database covering a range of encryption schemes. Each micro-benchmark test is run sequentially on the Control 1 database and then the encrypted database. Each consists consists of: creation, initialisation and workload scripts. The creation script creates the database table, primary key (for indexed retrieval) and payload columns appropriate to the benchmark, the initialisation script is used to set the encryption state of the key or payload (i.e. the schemes and columns used) and the workload script runs the test.
For each data layout and encryption scenario the following operations are evaluated: INSERT, SELECT EQUAL: Select the entire row by the key column; SELECT RANGE: Select a number of rows based on the integer key within the specified range; SELECT SUM: Select a sum of integer columns; SELECT ALL: Select all rows from all columns. Additional possible benchmarks are discussed in section VI.
The benchmarks are arranged in four test suites, summarised in Table II . They first test if a database operation is supported by the encryption schemes in use and then evaluate the performance and storage characteristics. To complement existing research this paper only presents results that combine multiple schemes.
The workload script was repeatedly executed (against both encrypted and plaintext databases) and timed using the MySQLSlap tool [13] and the total storage requirement was also recorded. The INSERT and SELECT ALL results were combined to form a Read/Write Ratio. Re-encryption is computationally expensive and would significantly distort benchmark results and changing encryption schemes would invalidate the benchmark. Consequently, for valid benchmarking purposes, we forced the encryption of columns to a particular state and verified that the columns remained in this state after the workload was executed (benchmarks that cause side effects are excluded). The evaluations use two suites of controls:
• Control Suite 1: This test set is run against the plaintext MySQL control database for all test conditions. The results for each suite are individually indexed to these results, i.e. each micro-benchmark is the corresponding control result.
• Control Suite 2: This test set is run against the CryptDB proxy without any encryption enabled. This captures the intrinsic performance overhead of the CryptDB proxy implementation, equipment configuration and architecture without any cryptographic operations executing. Control Suite 2 is used by [6] as an index value and is included here as a basis of comparison with these prior evaluations. 
A. Security Categorisation
This paper uses three security categorisations in the context of the passive Honest-but-Curious administrator Threat Model; unsecure, partially secure and secure. Of the operations exercised here RND and HOM are categorised as secure as they provide (distinct-) semantic security [14] . OPE is categorised as partially secure as it has been shown by [15] and others to leak information under certain conditions. Deterministic (DET) encryption will also leak information if the fields encrypted are non-unique (without a UNIQUE constraint); in these executions when DET is used as a primary key, we treat it as secure, while categorising it as partially secure when used to encrypt a payload field.
B. Evaluation Environment
The latest publicly available version of CryptDB [16] was used for all benchmarks. This code includes notes that it is not code used in [6] as discussed above. Two Amazon's EC2 Ubuntu 14.04.1 instances were deployed. The client instance ran the MySQLSlap tool to execute the workloads and the CryptDB proxy which encrypts the data. The server instance ran an unmodified MySQL 5.5.44. The Client and CryptDB proxy instance was a m4.10xlarge (40 vCPU 160 GB Ram) and the MySQL database ran on a m4.4xlarge instance (16 vCPU 64GB Ram). These environments were deliberately oversized for micro-benchmarks to avoid resource starvation, As this is a virtual execution environment there was a risk that other virtual resources may consume capacity and distort results. To minimise this risk all outliers with a z-score greater than 3 were discarded and the benchmarks re-run.
IV. RESULTS
After execution a small number outliers were removed (less than 0.5%).
The detailed results in Table III show the wide ranges of performance and storage factors recorded across the different operations and encryption options. From high level inspection of the results it can be observed that the storage factor penalty is fixed based on the encryption options chosen while the performance varies with both the encryption options and the SQL operation. These variances are discussed in IV-B and IV-C and illustrated in Figures 2-5 . It should be noted when reviewing these figures that the SQL operations should not be compared to each other as the results in each sub-figure are indexed back to the plaintext/unencrypted result.
Generally INSERT operations show the lowest performance degradation when using encryption, with the bulk of the additional latency being explained by the presence of the proxy rather than the performance of the encryption.
As expected the storage factor penalty is heavily influenced by the presence of a HOM encrypted field which requires 64 times the storage. The variance in the read/write ratio indicates that care should be exercised when applying assumptions about the relative cost of these operations. Decisions on how long to cache reads and writes can be influenced by this ratio. The storage factor of 3.76 measured in earlier Table III also includes three results reproduced from prior work on evaluating CryptDB. It should be noted that these results are not directly comparable with the micro-benchmarks experimental results reported here due to differences in the evaluation approach and software versions available.
A. Controls
The storage factor penalty and performance figures are indexed to Control 1 (standalone MySQL without CryptDB). Control 2 introduces the CryptDB Proxy but encrypts no fields. The factor of 5 performance reduction observed between Control 1 and 2 is inline with the latency increase (from 0.10 ms to 0.60 ms) reported in similar experiments in [6, Figure 12 ]. The increase in the Read/Write ratio between Control 1 and 2 suggests that the proxy adds more overhead while returning results. This is intuitively expected as even just parsing (with out processing) the larger result set will be more expensive than parsing the relatively small SQL queries. As expected the storage factor penalty is unchanged as there are no encrypted fields in these Controls Suites.
B. Suites 1 &2 (Plaintext Primary Key, Encrypted Payload)
The relative execution time results for Suites 1 and 2 are presented in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. These suites contain a single encrypted field as a payload and a plaintext Primary Key. As expected these test suites supported execution of all tested operations as the Primary Key was not encrypted and the encrypted payload is just stored and retrieved by the database transparently.
Encrypted INSERT operations are slower than plaintext INSERT operations although comparisons of these figures to Control Suite 2 in Table III shows that the actual encryption overhead is modest compared to the overhead incurred by the presence of the proxy.
C. Suites 3 & 4 (Encrypted Primary Key, no Payload)
In contrast to the first two test suites, suites 3 and 4 performed SQL operations on the encrypted payloads rather than merely retrieving them. These benchmarks exercise the usage of Property Preserving Encryption; i.e allowing operations on encrypted data. Figure 4 (Suite 3) highlights that some operations are not supported by certain configurations, i.e. the SELECT RANGE operation is not available when OPE is not used and SELECT EQUAL requires that DET or OPE be used. The SELECT ALL operation is faster when DET onion layer is used. Figure 5 presents the results for test suite 4, where the Primary Key was encrypted text. As with suite 3, the performance advantage of SELECT ALL operations with DET encryption can be seen. This empirical data presented across the performance, security and functionality dimensions are broadly in line with previous assessments. We supplement prior studies by providing additional detail, clarity and guidance.
This paper reveals nuances relating to the performance, security and functionality of the PPE schemes used in CryptDB and validates the utility of micro-benchmark based assessment approach. The results have illustrated that the partial-secure PPE schemes which facilitate operations (DET, OPE, HOM) have a non-trivial storage and performance penalty compared to the secure RND scheme. All encryption tested here showed a significant overhead due to the system architecture. The results in section IV-C showed that combining multiple PPE schemes facilitated the broadest range of operations though at a cost for some of those operations. As multiple encryption schemes are present and the transaction is atomic, the execution time for INSERT operations is bounded by the slowest encryption scheme. This suggests a potential optimisation strategy could be applied in certain applications by weakening the transactions atomic guarantees and adopting an eventually-consistent model where multiple encrypted columns are used. In all the SELECT cases the optimal execution strategy would be to use the column that can be decrypted fastest. From inspection of the suites DET and RND generally provides the fastest encryption and decryption.
A. Considerations for Application Designers
The data presented here supports the previously published experimental results [6] that illustrated that it is possible to design a secure database system with acceptable performance if close attention is paid to the operations required (and hence appropriate encryption schemes). These experiments have also highlighted that a CryptDB style solution may not suit certain workloads, e.g. an OLAP type applications with significant portion of computation performed in the database will incur a greater performance penalty than an OLTP application (which is not typically dominated by database performance) will suffer less degradation.
Two general principles can be applied here; don't encrypt fields unless needed (based on the relevant threat model for the application) and carefully evaluate what operations must be performed by the database. For example HOM addition has a large storage overhead; it may be more appropriate (when using queries that return small subsets) to use RND and do the addition in the application. These principles have an implication for applications with evolving requirements; encryption decision designs may have to be reassessed as the needs of the application change over time.
A significant optimisation for application designers would be to bypass the CryptDB Proxy for queries/tables that do not contain encrypted fields. This would involve some application changes and require the application to be aware which fields are encrypted.
VI. FUTURE WORK
This work has presented a micro-benchmark approach that could be be applied to other systems such as the work of SAP [17] ; Google's Encrypted BigQuery [18] or ARX [19] (a new encrypted database designed by the CryptDB authors).
While using multiple property preserving encryption schemes simultaneously allows additional operations to be executed on encrypted data, further research is needed to establish whether using multiple PPE schemes on the same data reduces the overall security of the system.
